Definition of Free Will

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guenther
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby guenther » Fri Dec 14, 2012 6:52 am UTC

jules.LT wrote:Meh, that depends too much on the question. For most questions, even human beings won't change their behaviours just because you told them what they would do.
How we react to being told what we'll do depends on how we treat that information, but I don't see how it would depend on how "free" that treatment is.

I'm not saying that freeness gives rise to the problem. I'm saying that whatever causes the problem could be part of what we want to describe as freeness.

And the problem isn't whether we can come up with a prediction that satisfies the circular consistency. Rather it's whether complete and perfect prediction is possible. Can this PKIC machine know all of the future when people have access to that future knowledge?

You're right that for much of our behavior, future knowledge won't matter. People like patterns, and simply being told that tomorrow we will follow the same patterns likely won't cause much alarm. However, if we are told that our destiny is set, then some people might be contrary simply to test if they do have a choice. Further, what if I looked at my future and realized that I didn't like where I was headed? Now it's not just about being contrary; I have a real incentive to try to do things differently. I just can't wrap my head around how such perfect prediction could actually be possible with people when they're aware of the result.
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby jules.LT » Fri Dec 14, 2012 8:35 am UTC

guenther wrote:And the problem isn't whether we can come up with a prediction that satisfies the circular consistency. Rather it's whether complete and perfect prediction is possible. Can this PKIC machine know all of the future when people have access to that future knowledge?

By definition it knows the future for any set of initial conditions. It just can't tell it to the subject without changing the initial conditions, which will possibly have a different outcome, which can be equally well predicted... which will again change the outcome if you tell it to the subject and it isn't a solution to the circular problem.

And preventing the existence of a solution has nothing to do with freeness: a simple machine that returns B when you tell it A and A when you tell it B can do that.

That is no an argument, it's just contradiction!
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby ucim » Fri Dec 14, 2012 3:21 pm UTC

guenther wrote:In a discussion that's explicitly about the mechanics that underlie a car, it can still be helpful to reference the car (the whole entity) as well as properties of the car (weight, speed, handling, etc.).
Those properties are not self-referencing, and strictly speaking, you should use mass instead of weight. But for the moment, let's look at handling. The car has some intrinsic properties vis a vis the mechanics of how it is put together. But to one person it is nimble and responsive, and to another person it is squirrely and hard to control. "Handling", as the term is often used, is not an intrinsic property. Can you come up with a good definition of "handling" in the context of a car that would make it so?

And there isn't even any self reference involved here. Free will is about how the entity affects its own manner of affecting things.

guenther wrote: Answering machines will carry on doing what answering machines do regardless of whether we tell it it's destiny.
We cannot tell an answering machine its destiny. We can talk to it, but it can't listen. Similarly (but not identically) if a superintellegent ant colony told us (in the form of pherimone trails) our own destiny, no communication would have taken place either.
Spoiler:
This of course raises the question of what constitutes "communication", (which is at its basis a "certain kind of change in state" of the receiver entity) which itself raises the question of how we model the entities.
Even if we get past that, "In this circumstance, you will do A" is different from "In this circumstance, after I tell you you will do A, you will do A", which is different from "in this circumstance, I tell you you will do A, and then you do A". jules.LT also refers to this, later.

guenther wrote:The point of the proposal is to question whether we can actually pre-determine our future, even in a deterministic universe.
This has already been proven false by Godel. No entity (sufficiently complex to be interesting) can model itself. Case closed.

I had however taken the point of the proposal as to question how we use (or mis-use) the concept of free will, by questioning what it "means". One way to do so is to expand any given usage of the term across different kinds of entities to see how it holds up or breaks down.

jules.LT wrote:What you seem to have a hard time understanding is that if you don't look at those mechanisms, each step is mandated by the laws of physics anyway! [...] the attitude of the observer doesn't have anything to do with it.
The attitude of the observer however does have something to do with the question being asked. I am saying, essentially, that the question "does [entity] have free will?" means something different depending on the attitude of the observer towards the entity being examined.

guenther wrote:If you put a toad in the circle, there's no risk. So my point was to highlight that there's something different between us and toads.
What we have here is a failure to communicate. Specifically, to the toad. The same result would occur if you put a Chinaman in the loop, because I don't speak Chinese.

TheGrammarBolshevik wrote:
ucim wrote:The reason is that if you look at the underlying mechanisms closely enough, each step is mandated by the laws of physics. Absent quantum effects (and I don't think QM is where "free will" comes from), the output of an entity is pretty much determined by its inputs. (And if we do take QM into account, QM fluctuations are not something that the entity has any control over anyway, unless you posit a soul). If the outputs of an entity are pretty much determined by the inputs, then what is doing the "willing" (of free will)?
The person. Like how the thing doing the driving is the car, or how the thing winning the Triple Crown is Miguel Cabrera, even though all these actions are determined by their inputs.

Why should something have to be an uncaused cause in order to act?
It doesn't. But it needs to be an uncaused cause to act "on its own". And that's what free will is all about: acting "on its own". To the extent that actions are determined by their inputs, there is no such thing as "on its own". But to the extent that we (as an observer) abstract out part of the mechanism, we are using "on its own" to refer to the mechanism without considering the mechanics.

jules.LT wrote:a simple machine that returns B when you tell it A and A when you tell it B can do that
A simple machine that understands when it is told what it can do is not such a simple machine!

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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby Trebla » Fri Dec 14, 2012 3:44 pm UTC

jules.LT wrote:By definition it knows the future for any set of initial conditions. It just can't tell it to the subject without changing the initial conditions, which will possibly have a different outcome, which can be equally well predicted... which will again change the outcome if you tell it to the subject and it isn't a solution to the circular problem.

And preventing the existence of a solution has nothing to do with freeness: a simple machine that returns B when you tell it A and A when you tell it B can do that.


This poses some pretty severe theological problems when "it" is both omniscient and omnipotent (rather than a PKIC prediction machine). If, as you say, it "can't" tell the subject without changing the outcome (making its knowledge about the actual initial conditions incorrect), then it either lacks omnipotence (there is something it can't do) or it lacks omniscience (it was wrong)... by my understanding of the terms, at least.

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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby jules.LT » Fri Dec 14, 2012 4:39 pm UTC

ucim wrote:
jules.LT wrote:What you seem to have a hard time understanding is that if you don't look at those mechanisms, each step is mandated by the laws of physics anyway! [...] the attitude of the observer doesn't have anything to do with it.
The attitude of the observer however does have something to do with the question being asked. I am saying, essentially, that the question "does [entity] have free will?" means something different depending on the attitude of the observer towards the entity being examined.

I mean exactly the same thing when I talk about free will while looking at molecules or entire people. And so does everyone I know but you. What good reason do you have for doing otherwise?

ucim wrote:
jules.LT references the part of the article where, in Discover magazine, Sean Carroll wrote:It would be silly to say that [emergent concept] isn’t “real,” just because the concept doesn’t appear in some fine-grained vocabulary.
I agree. But I would say that the [emergent concept] applies to the [emergent entity], which is itself an abstraction of its own nuts and bolts. Where the whole is more than the sum of the parts, an emergent property belongs properly to the whole, not to the collection of parts.

Let's backtrack a little:
- Do you agree that emergent entities still exist when you don't look at them?
- Then why would their properties change when you don't look at them?
- How is "free will" any different from other emergent concepts such as "mass" (thanks to Boson fields), "person" or "baseball"?

ucim wrote:
jules.LT wrote:a simple machine that returns B when you tell it A and A when you tell it B can do that
A simple machine that understands when it is told what it can do is not such a simple machine!

There's no need for "understanding" anything. Only being able to match the instruction to a sample.

Trebla wrote:This poses some pretty severe theological problems when "it" is both omniscient and omnipotent (rather than a PKIC prediction machine). If, as you say, it "can't" tell the subject without changing the outcome (making its knowledge about the actual initial conditions incorrect), then it either lacks omnipotence (there is something it can't do) or it lacks omniscience (it was wrong)...

In all those cases the entity knows the initial conditions and the outcome. It sometimes just happens that the prediction it gives to the subject isn't the right one, because doing otherwise is logically impossible. You can be a world-changing, reality-bending multidimensional timeless entity, you still won't be able to make A be non-A or 1+1≠2. "Omni"potence is logically nonsensical.
Bertrand Russell wrote:Not to be absolutely certain is, I think, one of the essential things in rationality.
Richard Feynman & many others wrote:Keep an open mind – but not so open that your brain falls out

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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby XTCamus » Fri Dec 14, 2012 6:11 pm UTC

Lucky for us a valid concept of free will has no need for omniscience, omnipotence, ghosts-in-the-machine, point-source actors, wish-fulfilling genies, or any of that crap. In fact since those concepts lead to paradoxes on their own, why would you expect using them to explain free will to help with internal consistency? Same thing goes for time travel. If your definition of free will requires these, you are doing it wrong, and are going to need a small army of theologians and uncountable angels dancing on pins in order to sort the resulting mess out.

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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby ucim » Fri Dec 14, 2012 10:02 pm UTC

jules.LT wrote:I mean exactly the same thing when I talk about free will while looking at molecules or entire people.
Well, what do you mean by free will? You said:
jules.LT wrote:Let me reiterate the nice definition that we found:
A set of capacities for:
- Imagining future courses of action
- Deliberating about one’s reasons for choosing them
- Planning one’s actions in light of this deliberation
- Controlling actions in the face of competing desires

"Unrestricted" implies causelessness since any cause would be a "restriction". It is therefore nonsensical.
People and dogs can certainly imagine future courses of action, in their own way. A simple answering machine cannot, because it cannot observe itself. But any entity complex enough to observe itself will satisfy the first condition.

Deliberating is possible for people, dogs, and answering machines, in their own way. But deliberating about one's (own) reasons for doing something is reflexive. Not only does the entity need to observe itself, it needs to model itself, which means (as a consequence of Godel's theorem) it needs to also abbreviate, or abstract itself in some way. It needs to also recognize parts of itself in relation to other parts of itself, and here is the hall of mirrors. The idea of free will is in part a way to draw a box around the hall of mirrors. The questioon "does [entity] have free will?" translates to "is there a hall of mirrors that we should draw a box around?"

And by "hall of mirrors" I don't refer to the entity itself, but rather, to the analysis of the entity we would do to answer the question. It's not so much a hall of mirrors as a slippery regress of definitions, where the "hard part" keeps being pushed back on some other term that we take for granted.

jules.LT wrote:Let's backtrack a little:
- Do you agree that emergent entities still exist when you don't look at them?
- Then why would their properties change when you don't look at them?
- How is "free will" any different from other emergent concepts such as "mass" (thanks to Boson fields), "person" or "baseball"?
Emergent entities exist (in their own way) whether you look at them or not. But they are ideas - abstractions - abbreviations, if you will, of their components. Baseball does not exist in the same way that a baseball exists.

jules.LT wrote:There's no need for "understanding" anything. Only being able to match the instruction to a sample.
I don't understand the statement. If you tell a Germain that he will choose pizza, but you tell him in Chinese, then you will not have told him anything. (unless he happens to speak Chinese).

Jose
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby guenther » Fri Dec 14, 2012 10:09 pm UTC

jules.LT wrote:By definition it knows the future for any set of initial conditions. It just can't tell it to the subject without changing the initial conditions, which will possibly have a different outcome, which can be equally well predicted... which will again change the outcome if you tell it to the subject and it isn't a solution to the circular problem.

First, the way I envisioned the PKIC machine is that it can't choose what answers to provide. Whoever holds the machine has access to all the results. Sorry for not making that clear.

Second, by definition, there is only one future for any set of initial conditions. This definition does not guarantee that our machine can actually compute it. We gave it perfect knowledge and infinite computational resources, but it still has to use plain old math to get the answer. Even with determinism and perfect knowledge, we may not be able to perfectly know the future.

jules.LT wrote:And preventing the existence of a solution has nothing to do with freeness: a simple machine that returns B when you tell it A and A when you tell it B can do that.

Preventing the existence of a solution =/= freeness, but it might be a necessary condition for freeness. Your machine example is the same as the one I gave here (last sentence). We can imagine something that can foil our test and yet isn't worthy of being attributed with free will. But can we come up with something that doesn't create the paradox that we intuitively feel should be described as having free will?

Anyway, it seems that the premise of this thought experiment is flawed, so it's kind of moot. I proposed that with toads and rocks, we'd get results that would converge. But if that's impossible too, then the hypothetical experiment doesn't yield anything useful.

---

ucim wrote:Those properties are not self-referencing, and strictly speaking, you should use mass instead of weight.

I presume your problem with weight is that it's not intrinsic, but as we discussed, mass may not be either. But does that matter? I say no. It's not about pinning down absolute truths; it's about coming up with useful abstractions. If we're in an area where gravity is basically constant, then treating weight as a property of the entity is just fine. And I would think that one could meaningfully capture handling as a property as well, but if not, then so be it. That's not particularly relevant to my case.

Second, what's your point about self-referencing? My point was that we can just say "Free will is a property of the entity" in the same way we would say "Speed is a property of the car" (which I raised because I thought your use of "consider" might lead to confusion). Are you objecting to this phrasing?

ucim wrote:This has already been proven false by Godel. No entity (sufficiently complex to be interesting) can model itself. Case closed.

It seemed mathematically impossible, but I didn't know it had been proven. Nor did I know that Godel's theorem proved it. (I've tried to follow through the details of that proof, but I didn't get very far. :))

I still don't understand why the same scenario with the toad is impossible. If we can predict the future of a toad in a closed room, then it seems that putting the computer within the room, but not interacting other than to show the results would still be doable. Though I suppose at that point, it not only has to predict what the toad will do, but it also has to predict what the screen will display. Maybe this is the loop that makes it fail, even for something as simple as a rock. In which case, my thought experiment doesn't work.

ucim wrote:What we have here is a failure to communicate. Specifically, to the toad. The same result would occur if you put a Chinaman in the loop, because I don't speak Chinese.

We granted ourselves a magical computer; can't we also pretend it spits out Chinese text? :) Let's set aside the impossibility of the math for a second. If the subject of the test can understand future predictions, but the box simply doesn't output in a language the subject understands, then I'd say the test is incomplete. So the test requires that we get the appropriate translator. This means that aliens would have to do that for us as well, or have an incomplete test. For the toad, is there an appropriate translator that would allow it to act on the future predictions? I agree that it's a matter of communication, but for people, it's about finding the appropriate language, not about whether they actually possess an ability to communicate that sort of sophisticated information. My preferred notion of free will is about capturing capability, which is precisely how we differ from toads in this area.

Of course, this communication question embedded in my proposed thought experiment doesn't work, as you've pointed out. And without the thought experiment, then it's just back to the notion of free will that I've been championing.
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby doogly » Fri Dec 14, 2012 10:14 pm UTC

A Chinaman? Really?
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby ucim » Fri Dec 14, 2012 10:52 pm UTC

guenther wrote:I presume your problem with weight is that it's not intrinsic, but as we discussed, mass may not be either. But does that matter?
No, it was a nitpick. :)
guenther wrote:Second, what's your point about self-referencing? My point was that we can just say "Free will is a property of the entity" in the same way we would say "Speed is a property of the car"
Speed is measurable, quantifiable, and easily defined. None of these is the case for free will, unless you accept that free will and driven behavior are not opposites, but complementary. I know you do, but many others see them as opposites.
guenther wrote:It seemed mathematically impossible, but I didn't know it had been proven. Nor did I know that Godel's theorem proved it. (I've tried to follow through the details of that proof, but I didn't get very far. :))
I highly recommend "Godel Escher Bach". Read it slowly, read it several times. (but don't use "happy apple happy happy horse" as your password, no matter how tempting!)
guenther wrote:I still don't understand why the same scenario with the toad is impossible.
The problem arises when you (try to) tell the toad your prediction to see if it changes anything. Unless you speak toad, you won't succeed in telling the toad anything, and thus you won't be running the experiment I think you intended to run.
guenther wrote: If the subject of the test can understand future predictions, but the box simply doesn't output in a language the subject understands, then I'd say the test is incomplete.
... which is what I said. So, we are on the same page here.
guenther wrote:So the test requires that we get the appropriate translator. This means that aliens would have to do that for us as well, or have an incomplete test. For the toad, is there an appropriate translator that would allow it to act on the future predictions? I agree that it's a matter of communication, but for people, it's about finding the appropriate language, not about whether they actually possess an ability to communicate that sort of sophisticated information.
A failure of the experiment can be tied to either a failure to translate (i.e. communicate) or a failure of the entity to understand, in its own way. But without knowing that the failure is not in the translation, you can't say that the failure is in the understanding (and thus in the possession of free will).

doogly wrote:A Chinaman? Really?
Anyone who doesn't speak or understand the language being used in the example. I picked at random (Originally I picked a Frenchman, but wanted to get farther afield).

Jose
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby guenther » Fri Dec 14, 2012 11:25 pm UTC

ucim wrote:Speed is measurable, quantifiable, and easily defined. None of these is the case for free will, unless you accept that free will and driven behavior are not opposites, but complementary. I know you do, but many others see them as opposites.

I get that speed is much simpler than free will. But that still doesn't mean that similar language is somehow inappropriate.

ucim wrote:I highly recommend "Godel Escher Bach". Read it slowly, read it several times. (but don't use "happy apple happy happy horse" as your password, no matter how tempting!)

Thanks for the reference. I like Escher a lot, too. I'll have to check it out.

ucim wrote:A failure of the experiment can be tied to either a failure to translate (i.e. communicate) or a failure of the entity to understand, in its own way. But without knowing that the failure is not in the translation, you can't say that the failure is in the understanding (and thus in the possession of free will).

I thought the failure of the experiment rested firmly with Godel's theorem. None of this language stuff matters if the experiment can't even work with a rock. Or even by itself. It sounds like it would fail in all scenarios.

But aside from that, are you saying that we are in the dark if toads have a secret language that we can't access? Toads aren't exactly a black box. Shouldn't we be able to probe whether they have the ability to understand sophisticated statements about their future? This could happen by looking at their behavior, or by looking at their internal mechanisms. Or both. We can look at their cognitive capacities.

Can we prove they don't have some secret method of complex communication? No. But if there's no mechanism and no apparent behavior to give us reason to think that, it's reasonable to dismiss the idea.
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby ucim » Sat Dec 15, 2012 1:38 am UTC

guenther wrote:I get that speed is much simpler than free will. But that still doesn't mean that similar language is somehow inappropriate.
No, but it does waggle its eyebrows suggestively.... It's not that speed is just simpler, it is that free will is not well defined (which is the source of this thread). It means something different to each person. Speed does not have this issue. And unlike speed, free will involves self-reference, which introduces subtle but profound effects.

guenther wrote:I thought the failure of the experiment rested firmly with Godel's theorem.
If you can't speak toad, Godel's theroem does not apply, because no self reference ever happens.

guenther wrote:Shouldn't we be able to probe whether they have the ability to understand sophisticated statements about their future?
Yes, in theory. By doing so, we'll probably learn to speak toad. We have the same question for an advanced AI, but in reverse. With toad, we are starting from the abstractions, and trying to figure out mechanisms. With an AI (that we create) we'll be starting from the mechanisms, and trying to figure out to what extent certain abstractions are applicable. With an AI on a UFO, we'll be doing both (though if we ever face that, we're probably SOL!)

guenther wrote:Can we prove they don't have some secret method of complex communication? No. But if there's no mechanism and no apparent behavior to give us reason to think that, it's reasonable to dismiss the idea.
I wouldn't be so quick to dismiss that idea. It wasn't so long ago we thought sea creatures didn't speak, and monkeys had no high level language ability.
Spoiler:
It turns out that not only do monkeys have high level language ability, they even taught our artificial language to their children! The experiment was ended after that. Insert conspiracy theory here.
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby guenther » Sat Dec 15, 2012 7:13 am UTC

ucim wrote:No, but it does waggle its eyebrows suggestively.... It's not that speed is just simpler, it is that free will is not well defined (which is the source of this thread). It means something different to each person. Speed does not have this issue. And unlike speed, free will involves self-reference, which introduces subtle but profound effects.

Your waggle detection must be stronger than mine. :) The fact that free will means different things to different people is not a black mark against a proposed definition of free will. That just means not everyone accepts it.

I agree that even with the proposed definition, it doesn't have a full depth of rigor and specificity. Will there be lurking problems as it gets fleshed out, like with how to deal with self-reference? Perhaps, but my guess is that it could all be worked through (and perhaps in multiple ways, which means more room for disagreement). I suspect that why this hasn't happened yet is because there's no real need for it.

ucim wrote:If you can't speak toad, Godel's theroem does not apply, because no self reference ever happens.

Self-reference does happen. The self-reference is that the PKIC machine is computing it's own future. If you replace the toad with a rock, you get the same problem. If you replace it with nothing, the same problem. It has nothing to do with language. At least that's my best understanding of the problem you presented with my thought experiment.

ucim wrote:I wouldn't be so quick to dismiss that idea. It wasn't so long ago we thought sea creatures didn't speak, and monkeys had no high level language ability.

Well, color me skeptical. It's not about whether toads can communicate, but whether they have the capacity for sophisticated communication that can handle details about it's own future.

Anyway, I picked toad because as a non-mammal it has no neocortex. I figured it was primitive enough such that we wouldn't be debating whether secret toad-speak exists. My whole point could be made with even simpler life, presuming there's something other than rock where we can both agree that it can't handle the level of communication required for the thought experiment. Assuming said thought experiment was relevant anymore. :)
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby ucim » Sat Dec 15, 2012 4:47 pm UTC

guenther wrote:Self-reference does happen. The self-reference is that the PKIC machine is computing it's own future.
Yes, you are right. I was concentrating on another part of the experiment (or perhaps misreading it). Once such a machine is part of the system, the problem occurs. So, it doesn't even matter.

Perhaps we should consider a different approach.

Limiting the discussion right now to just people, consider that when we make a choice, it is often between two alternatives whose consequences are not very extreme. We will eat pizza with anchovies, or we will have a hamburger. We'll wear the red dress, or the green slacks. But sometimes our choices have much more divergent consequences: we'll fork over $20, or we'll get a bullet in the head. We'll go to our appointment or we'll take our sister to the hospital. We'll vote for the only reasonable candidate or we'll be responsible for the destruction of our country.

Sometimes when we make a choice, we are not in our "right mind" (whatever that means). We could be under the influence of alcohol, true love, stress, mental illness, propaganda, drugs, fear, etc. (Some of these could be attributed to the external environment, but they all produce a mental state.)

Granted that all of these circumstances, and the divergence of the consequences are a matter of degree, to what extent do we agree on the usage of the term "free will" for choices made under these circumstances, as opposed to choices made under duress, or choices made without thinking at all (instinctive reactions, say)?

Does this fit in with the classification of "free will" as an abstraction of a certain mental process involved in choice?

Jose
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby XTCamus » Mon Dec 17, 2012 1:35 am UTC

ucim wrote:
guenther wrote:Self-reference does happen. The self-reference is that the PKIC machine is computing it's own future.
Yes, you are right. I was concentrating on another part of the experiment (or perhaps misreading it). Once such a machine is part of the system, the problem occurs. So, it doesn't even matter.

Perhaps we should consider a different approach.

Limiting the discussion right now to just people, consider that when we make a choice, it is often between two alternatives whose consequences are not very extreme. We will eat pizza with anchovies, or we will have a hamburger. We'll wear the red dress, or the green slacks. But sometimes our choices have much more divergent consequences: we'll fork over $20, or we'll get a bullet in the head. We'll go to our appointment or we'll take our sister to the hospital. We'll vote for the only reasonable candidate or we'll be responsible for the destruction of our country.

Sometimes when we make a choice, we are not in our "right mind" (whatever that means). We could be under the influence of alcohol, true love, stress, mental illness, propaganda, drugs, fear, etc. (Some of these could be attributed to the external environment, but they all produce a mental state.)

Granted that all of these circumstances, and the divergence of the consequences are a matter of degree, to what extent do we agree on the usage of the term "free will" for choices made under these circumstances, as opposed to choices made under duress, or choices made without thinking at all (instinctive reactions, say)?

Does this fit in with the classification of "free will" as an abstraction of a certain mental process involved in choice?

Jose

Yes! If we can keep the conversation at this level for a while, where people and decisions keep their generally accepted definitions. Free wil as you've outlined here is an appropriate "abstraction of a certain mental process involved in choice" in every one of your examples of choice. An instinctive reaction is a choice made without thinking much, though I wouldn't go so far as to say it takes no thinking at all, since even instinct takes a degree of brain-power or intention. But if an instinctive response is where you are at the time, or the type of creature you are, than this choice still reflects your "best interests" as you perceive them at that time. Whether in the past, or in the seconds just prior to acting, you thought about your choices for a little longer, or recently saw an advertisement which affected you without you hardly noticing, or had a moving experience which affected you deeply, you are still self-actuating and demonstrating your personal desires at that moment. This does not change regardless of how many hours you spent dwelling on what kind of person you truly wished you could be, as this was also influenced by your genes, your environment and your personal history (and true love, mental illness et al). So who you are and what you want is constantly being demonstrated by your free will! Seriously, what more could you realistically ask for from free will?

Stay at this level for a minute, and show me where any paradoxes arise. Some of the above arguments sound like people who after hearing Zeno's paradox for the first time start to question if any arrow has ever actually reached a tree. Isn't it possible that the "insight" which led you to conclude that free will is an illusion, might itself be illusory?

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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby Catmando » Mon Dec 17, 2012 7:08 am UTC

XTCamus wrote:
ucim wrote:
guenther wrote:Self-reference does happen. The self-reference is that the PKIC machine is computing it's own future.
Yes, you are right. I was concentrating on another part of the experiment (or perhaps misreading it). Once such a machine is part of the system, the problem occurs. So, it doesn't even matter.

Perhaps we should consider a different approach.

Limiting the discussion right now to just people, consider that when we make a choice, it is often between two alternatives whose consequences are not very extreme. We will eat pizza with anchovies, or we will have a hamburger. We'll wear the red dress, or the green slacks. But sometimes our choices have much more divergent consequences: we'll fork over $20, or we'll get a bullet in the head. We'll go to our appointment or we'll take our sister to the hospital. We'll vote for the only reasonable candidate or we'll be responsible for the destruction of our country.

Sometimes when we make a choice, we are not in our "right mind" (whatever that means). We could be under the influence of alcohol, true love, stress, mental illness, propaganda, drugs, fear, etc. (Some of these could be attributed to the external environment, but they all produce a mental state.)

Granted that all of these circumstances, and the divergence of the consequences are a matter of degree, to what extent do we agree on the usage of the term "free will" for choices made under these circumstances, as opposed to choices made under duress, or choices made without thinking at all (instinctive reactions, say)?

Does this fit in with the classification of "free will" as an abstraction of a certain mental process involved in choice?

Jose

Yes! If we can keep the conversation at this level for a while, where people and decisions keep their generally accepted definitions. Free wil as you've outlined here is an appropriate "abstraction of a certain mental process involved in choice" in every one of your examples of choice. An instinctive reaction is a choice made without thinking much, though I wouldn't go so far as to say it takes no thinking at all, since even instinct takes a degree of brain-power or intention. But if an instinctive response is where you are at the time, or the type of creature you are, than this choice still reflects your "best interests" as you perceive them at that time. Whether in the past, or in the seconds just prior to acting, you thought about your choices for a little longer, or recently saw an advertisement which affected you without you hardly noticing, or had a moving experience which affected you deeply, you are still self-actuating and demonstrating your personal desires at that moment. This does not change regardless of how many hours you spent dwelling on what kind of person you truly wished you could be, as this was also influenced by your genes, your environment and your personal history (and true love, mental illness et al). So who you are and what you want is constantly being demonstrated by your free will! Seriously, what more could you realistically ask for from free will?

Stay at this level for a minute, and show me where any paradoxes arise. Some of the above arguments sound like people who after hearing Zeno's paradox for the first time start to question if any arrow has ever actually reached a tree. Isn't it possible that the "insight" which led you to conclude that free will is an illusion, might itself be illusory?


I'm not sure about any paradoxes, but if you're looking for general objections, then I'll say this: we can't choose what sensory data we allow to affect us and we don't decide how that sensory data affects us, and if data is the sole driving force behind our changing "best interests," then consciousness is superfluous. And if consciousness is superfluous, then it is meaningless to say that "we" have free will; you could just as easily ascribe it to p-zombies--they'd even act the same.

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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby jules.LT » Mon Dec 17, 2012 2:02 pm UTC

guenther wrote:Preventing the existence of a solution =/= freeness, but it might be a necessary condition for freeness. Your machine example is the same as the one I gave here (last sentence). We can imagine something that can foil our test and yet isn't worthy of being attributed with free will. But can we come up with something that doesn't create the paradox that we intuitively feel should be described as having free will?

A person who obeys the prediction willingly fits the bill. Make him extatic about it so there's no constraint on his will (there was an example by Locke earlier in the thread, about a man held in a place that he actually desires being in: he's still staying there of his own free will)

guenter wrote:
ucim wrote:This has already been proven false by Godel. No entity (sufficiently complex to be interesting) can model itself. Case closed.

It seemed mathematically impossible, but I didn't know it had been proven. Nor did I know that Godel's theorem proved it.

It didn't.
Gödel's theorem proves that any axiomatic system* which allows the manipulation of the natural numbers is either inconsistent or incomplete**. As a corollary, no system can prove its own consistency.
That's one of many scientific concepts that are routinely imported into philosophy and atrociously butchered. Along with the theory of relativity, the 2nd law of thermodynamics, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, the chaos theory, the Banach-Tarski paradox, etc.

As ucim later said, the problem in our case is about simulating perfectly a system that includes the simulator. It has to take more subparticles than it simulates, so more than the full system itself.

*a set of most basic rules that have to be admitted without proof and upon which all of a mathematical system is based
**there are true statements that can be expressed in it but can't be proven

ucim wrote:free will involves self-reference

Free will does not require that we describe ourselves completely, it's only a crude model. So there is no paradox.

__________________________________________________________________________________

As for the series of example, I think that we could devise a best case scenario of someone whose will is the most free, and consider that any variation makes him less free.

It would be a being who can fully understands himself and his motivations (already impossible)
Free from external constraints (impossible too)
...

Sorry but I end up with the same list of capacities:
- Imagining future courses of action
- Deliberating about one’s reasons for choosing them
- Planning one’s actions in light of this deliberation
- Controlling actions in the face of competing desires

Without considering whether these are sufficient for having free will, do we agree that if you have free will then you have all of these capacities (i.e they're necessary conditions)?
Bertrand Russell wrote:Not to be absolutely certain is, I think, one of the essential things in rationality.
Richard Feynman & many others wrote:Keep an open mind – but not so open that your brain falls out

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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby makc » Mon Dec 17, 2012 6:30 pm UTC

Spoiler:
Sanjuricus wrote:For me, free will is plain and simple. It is the ability to choose.
So if I write

Code: Select all

if (random () > 0.5) {
    choose(0);
} else {
    choose(1);
}
my program will be able to choose between 0 and 1. will it, therefore, have free will? (assuming "random" function returns truly random number such as this one, if you feel like you have issues with pseudorandom generators)


... We're on page 14 now. Try to keep up?

- Az

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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby guenther » Tue Dec 18, 2012 7:03 am UTC

jules.LT wrote:As ucim later said, the problem in our case is about simulating perfectly a system that includes the simulator. It has to take more subparticles than it simulates, so more than the full system itself.

Well, at least we all agree that the experiment wouldn't work.

ucim wrote:Granted that all of these circumstances, and the divergence of the consequences are a matter of degree, to what extent do we agree on the usage of the term "free will" for choices made under these circumstances, as opposed to choices made under duress, or choices made without thinking at all (instinctive reactions, say)?

From my view, it can be tricky to pin down which individual choices come from free will. I like to think of free will as conceptually "driving the ship". Or perhaps I'll try out a new analogy: managing a business. In a company, there are people who control various specific parts of making widgets, but the head of the company is responsible for deciding whether to even be in the widget business, whether to go for the high-end market or low-end, where to build design and manufacturing facilities, etc. There are countless individual decisions that all the employees make, and how much of these do we lay at the feet of upper management? Well, ultimately they are responsible for them, even if they didn't directly cause the choice to happen.

I don't know how well the analogy holds, but it hopefully conveys my perspective on free will. Are unthought actions a product of free will? Well hopefully they're at least endorsed by free will, or if not, then we have the capacity to override them somehow. When does someone lose free will? If someone loses those higher order capacities (as quoted by jules.LT). For example, if some drug causes us to simply follow our impulses without any real awareness of the future consequences. Or maybe someone knows the consequences and regrets them, yet is completely unable to take different actions.
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby ucim » Tue Dec 18, 2012 7:23 pm UTC

Staying at the level of just people and free will, in the ordinary sense of the words, and a descriptive definition by enumeration, I would have a hard time saying that somebody I have at gunpoint is choosing "of their own free will" to give me $20. They would probably not give me the money without my coercion encouragement. Slipping somebody a mickey and then claiming that their amourous advances are "of their own free will" is likewise duplicitous. Somebody whose extreme obsessive-compulsive behavior is due to mental illness is not usually said to be performing this behavior "of their own free will".

I do think that I choose between pizza and pasta "of my own free will" (at least when both are offered). But there may well be behavior (snacking on chocolate?) that I perform without being very aware of it, or at least without giving it much considered thought. Large grocery chains are very well aware of this, and arrange their aisles to maximize the chance that the arm will operate without signallig the higher cortex.

More generally,
  • choices made where there really is no reasonable choice in the matter (do I interrupt my TV show to take my sister to the doctor if she's having a seizure?) would fall in the area where "free will" gets grey. These are choices where the consequences of one selection over another are vastly different, and I am already strongly predisposed towards one of the outcomes. In a sense, the choice was made long before it was presented - it was made as I developed into the person I am.
  • choices made when "who I am" has been significantly changed by external circumstances (like drugs) also fall out of the category of "clearly free will". The choice, again, was made before it was presented, only in this case it may not have been made by me, but by the person who drugged me. (but am I not always "me"? What does "me" mean?)
  • choices made without deliberation might even said not to be choices, but automatic responses - e.g. I have pizza with anchovies. I always have pizza with anchovies. I don't even think about it - that's what comes out of my mouth at the pizza parlor, and I like the result, and always have.
All of these are a matter of degree, and what degree we choose to use as a boundary depends on the use being made of the concept of "free will" at the moment - whether to judge, to philosophize, to encourage certain behavior, whatever.

No paradoxes arise directly, except that we may become inconsistent in applying the term to certain behavior depending on circumstance. However, we have not (so far) carefully defined important words that are being used in the definition description: "choose", "me", "reasonable", "higher cortex", "automatic". It is when we try to pin these down that we may run into issues, especially if we attempt to put them in opposition to each other - i.e. "automatic" or "coerced" vs "free will". That's where it gets slippery - and even more so when the discussion encompasses arbitrary entities.

On the earlier discussion course -
jules.LT wrote:
guenther wrote:
ucim wrote:This has already been proven false by Godel. No entity (sufficiently complex to be interesting) can model itself. Case closed.
It seemed mathematically impossible, but I didn't know it had been proven. Nor did I know that Godel's theorem proved it.
It didn't.
Gödel's theorem proves that any axiomatic system* which allows the manipulation of the natural numbers is either inconsistent or incomplete**. As a corollary, no system can prove its own consistency.
Correct. I was a bit sloppy, I suppose, but this is not a mathematical treatise, and I abbreviated somewhat. The issue arises when leaving the comfortable world of assuming people are consicous, and trying to figure out whether an AI, or a dog, or a toad, is also conscious in a way that lets us apply the concept of free will to it.

jules.LT wrote:I end up with the same list of capacities:

- Imagining future courses of action
- Deliberating about one’s reasons for choosing them
- Planning one’s actions in light of this deliberation
- Controlling actions in the face of competing desires

Without considering whether these are sufficient for having free will, do we agree that if you have free will then you have all of these capacities (i.e they're necessary conditions)?
I'm not sure I'm ready to go there yet, for two (kinds of) reasons.

First, I'd like to see a consensus (or see where we fail to come to a consensus) on a set of specific actions that do (or do not) involve free will, to build up a descriptive definition against which to test a prescriptive one.

Second, the words "imagine", "deliberate", "desire" need clarification if this set of capacities is to be applied to arbitrary entities. We think we know what they mean when applied to people, but how would we apply them to an AI? A slug? A dog?

guenther wrote:I like to think of free will as conceptually "driving the ship".
A nice metaphor, which illustrates my original point. What is the "you" that is doing the willing, and what is the ship? Once you try to figure out how the "you" is driving the "ship", there's a new "you" and a new "ship" in that description.

The business analogy holds very well, and is quite illustrative. A company can certainly be an entity to which we could apply the concept of "free will". But when we look closer, we are no longer looking at the company, but at its parts.

Jose
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby makc » Tue Dec 18, 2012 8:14 pm UTC

ucim wrote:I would have a hard time saying that somebody I have at gunpoint is choosing "of their own free will" to give me $20.
Why, they could freely choose to try and kick you in the balls instead :)
ucim wrote: They would probably not give me the money without my coercion encouragement.
Just because you could say P ( givig you $20 | being at gunpoint ) > 0.5 does not mean they are not free, or does it? Should we just say that one is free "from X" if P(whatever | X) = P (whatever | not X) ?

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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby jules.LT » Tue Dec 18, 2012 9:04 pm UTC

ucim wrote:choices made where there really is no reasonable choice in the matter [...] would fall in the area where "free will" gets grey.
I'd call those almost black, in that we have a very tiny bit of choice to do the absurd, but yeah.
@makc: we still have a will, but it's definitely not free; clear constraints are in place.
ucim wrote:choices made without deliberation might even said not to be choices, but automatic responses [...] All of these are a matter of degree
Agreed
ucim wrote:this is not a mathematical treatise, and I abbreviated somewhat.
My abbreviation takes two lines. Sorry to say it, but your application of the theorem was just wrong...
ucim wrote:The issue arises when leaving the comfortable world of assuming people are consicous, and trying to figure out whether an AI, or a dog, or a toad, is also conscious in a way that lets us apply the concept of free will to it.
Yeah. That's the "boundary" problem. One other problem, and a less subjective one, is on what scales those boundaries are.

ucim wrote:
jules.LT wrote: - Imagining future courses of action
- Deliberating about one’s reasons for choosing them
- Planning one’s actions in light of this deliberation
- Controlling actions in the face of competing desires

Without considering whether these are sufficient for having free will, do we agree that if you have free will then you have all of these capacities (i.e they're necessary conditions)?

I'm not sure I'm ready to go there yet, for two (kinds of) reasons.

First, I'd like to see a consensus (or see where we fail to come to a consensus) on a set of specific actions that do (or do not) involve free will, to build up a descriptive definition against which to test a prescriptive one.
Based on your examples and others, I tried to come up with a description. But I ended up with the same list. Do you disagree that it describes free will pretty well?

ucim wrote:No paradoxes arise directly, except that we may become inconsistent in applying the term to certain behavior depending on circumstance. However, we have not (so far) carefully defined important words that are being used in the definition description: "choose", "me", "reasonable", "higher cortex", "automatic". It is when we try to pin these down that we may run into issues, especially if we attempt to put them in opposition to each other - i.e. "automatic" or "coerced" vs "free will". That's where it gets slippery - and even more so when the discussion encompasses arbitrary entities.
[...]
Second, the words "imagine", "deliberate", "desire" need clarification if this set of capacities is to be applied to arbitrary entities. We think we know what they mean when applied to people, but how would we apply them to an AI? A slug? A dog?
You shouldn't just ask the questions. Propose solutions!
Let's give it a go.
- "imagining": producing simulations of things that do not necessarily exist. In this case, possible futures
- "desire" : goal or subgoal of the entity, as produced by its most basic to most complex processes
- "deliberate": evaluate the impact of the various simulated scenarios on one's goals
- "choice": result of deliberation. Scenario which, according to the simulation, will most advance the goals (weighed according to their priority), and upon which action will be taken.

ucim wrote:
guenther wrote:I like to think of free will as conceptually "driving the ship".
A nice metaphor, which illustrates my original point. What is the "you" that is doing the willing, and what is the ship? Once you try to figure out how the "you" is driving the "ship", there's a new "you" and a new "ship" in that description.

The business analogy holds very well, and is quite illustrative. A company can certainly be an entity to which we could apply the concept of "free will".
No: "you" is the whole thing. The ship, crew and all. The company and all it encompasses. The captain/CEO is the consciousness.
- "consciousness": the part of the mental process that is aware of itself and the rest of the person it is part of, that is that it constructs mental objects that represent them and works on these.

One last thought I wanted to share, even if it's not totally novel:
How we react to a given factor depends strictly on who we are, i.e. internal factors, but who we are all comes from external causes... So those two are inextricable.
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby ucim » Tue Dec 18, 2012 11:45 pm UTC

makc wrote:Just because you could say P ( givig you $20 | being at gunpoint ) > 0.5 does not mean they are not free, or does it?
That is the question, isn't it? When casually talking about free will, we have a certain "sense" (but may not all have the same sense of it). There probably is a value of P where we stop using the phrase "he gave me the money of his own free will" and start using the phrase "he forced it out of me". Each of us probably have different values of P for which this tends to happen. Some of us may have very different values of P for this.

jules.LT wrote:@makc: we still have a will, but it's definitely not free; clear constraints are in place.
What is the difference between a constraint and an unpleasant option?

jules.LT wrote:Based on your examples and others, I tried to come up with a description. But I ended up with the same list. Do you disagree that it describes free will pretty well?
Casually speaking they look fine. They are not sufficient conditions, if my donation of $20 at gunpoint is not to be considered "of my own free will". Neccessary conditions? I'm not sure, especially when expanded to arbitrary entities, such as a chess playing AI (whether or not it includes heuristics).

But then, given a list of actual examples using people, I'm not sure we would agree on whether we'd use the term "of my own free will" for the choices made, and it is in this narrow confine that we have developed our own sense of what we each mean by "free will".

So, I propose a set of scenarios. To what extent (0 to 10) would you agree that "of his or her own free will" applies?
  • A soldier, of his or her own free will, jumped on a live grenade when it was thrown into the foxhole.
  • A student, of his or her own free will, chooses to take another math course instead of a lighter load, or an acting class.
  • While walking down the street, a person, of his or her own free will, gives $20 to a large man who requests it.
  • Same as above, except that the man's request is punctuated by a deadly weapon.
  • At a restaurant, a person, of his or her own free will, orders "the usual".
  • After being drugged, somebody's date agrees, of his or her own free will, to have sex.
  • After being wined and dined, somebody's date agrees, of his or her own free will, to have sex.
  • Somebody, of his or her own free will, shoots somebody else.
  • Same as above, but that "somebody else" was doing robbing a store.
  • Same as above, but that "somebody else" was instead attacking his or her sister.
  • Somebody having psychotic episode, of his or her own free will, shoots somebody else.

jules.LT wrote:No: "you" is the whole thing. The ship, crew and all. The company and all it encompasses. The captain/CEO is the consciousness.
Do we have general agreement on this? I think it depends on why the question is being asked - i.e. the context.

jules.LT wrote:One last thought I wanted to share, even if it's not totally novel:
How we react to a given factor depends strictly on who we are, i.e. internal factors, but who we are all comes from external causes... So those two are inextricable.
Exactly. So if "who we are" is ultimately external, applying the concept of "free will" to "who we are" is problematic.

In casual parlance we tend to consider "who we are" as being shaped by external events which happened long ago and have been absorbed over time, making permanent changes in ourselves, and we tend to consider external events that are much more proximate to the choice being made as "just circumstances" that influence "who we are" to do or not do something. But in reality, they blend together, do they not?

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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby guenther » Wed Dec 19, 2012 12:43 am UTC

ucim wrote:A nice metaphor, which illustrates my original point. What is the "you" that is doing the willing, and what is the ship? Once you try to figure out how the "you" is driving the "ship", there's a new "you" and a new "ship" in that description.

At one level, I want to say the "you" is your conscious self, while "you" plus the ship is the whole person. And if this abstraction doesn't lend itself well to evaluating the mechanism underneath, it doesn't mean the abstraction stops being useful.

However, maybe there is a way to marry the abstraction to the underlying mechanics. If the "you" is the parts of the brain that are responsible for the underlying capabilities that we associate with free will, then we can look at the mechanics of how "you" does the deciding without getting into infinite recursion.

(I agree with jules.LT about "you" referring to the whole person. But here I'm referring to our perception that we are a person inside our own head. So in this context, "you" refers to a sub-section of the whole.)

ucim wrote:So, I propose a set of scenarios. To what extent (0 to 10) would you agree that "of his or her own free will" applies?

I'm happy to let others chime in with their opinions, but, as I said, this is tough for me to do with my view on free will. If we view free will as a set of higher order cognitive capacities, does someone only use their free will when they directly make choices through that process? Or if, upon reflection, someone is satisfied with their more instinctive or habitual choices, can we say that those were of their free will? Or conversely, if someone fully uses these capacities, but there is clear external duress (like the gunpoint scenario), is that from their free will? I would answer No, Yes, Yes, but I don't hold those opinions too strongly. (In the last case, I think what's more relevant than free will is how we treat moral and legal responsibility. We don't need to resolve the former to answer the latter.)

So I suppose this is a difference of whether we're asking "Do they have free will?" versus "Is this choice of their own free will?". Most of what I've written is about addressing the first question, but now we are venturing into the second. However, there is some overlap, like if someone's cognitive capacities are reduced to the point that free will is hampered or non-existent, then clearly their actions are not of their free will.
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby jules.LT » Wed Dec 19, 2012 11:22 am UTC

ucim wrote:So, I propose a set of scenarios. To what extent (0 to 10) would you agree that "of his or her own free will" applies?

Once again, don't just ask the questions: answer them!
But in a way you answered them already: with "of his or her own free will" in every question, it's obviously a 10 :mrgreen:
I'll ignore those.

  • A soldier, of his or her own free will, jumped on a live grenade when it was thrown into the foxhole.(10)
  • A student, of his or her own free will, chooses to take another math course instead of a lighter load, or an acting class.(9)
  • While walking down the street, a person,of his or her own free will, gives $20 to a large man who requests it.(8)
  • Same as above, except that the man's request is punctuated by a deadly weapon.(2)
  • At a restaurant, a person, of his or her own free will, orders "the usual".(9)
  • After being drugged, somebody's date agrees, of his or her own free will, to have sex.(0)
  • After being wined and dined, somebody's date agrees, of his or her own free will, to have sex.(7)
  • Somebody, of his or her own free will, shoots somebody else.(that seriously depends on why)
  • Same as above, but that "somebody else" was doing robbing a store.(10)
  • Same as above, but that "somebody else" was instead attacking his or her sister.(10)
  • Somebody having psychotic episode, of his or her own free will, shoots somebody else.(0)
This is actually interesting, it made me realize that I don't consider decisions based on one's ethical values to be less free.

But those situations are very incomplete, so I had to make assumptions. I tried to make them the most "neutral" possible, so there are "no" other factors... like no particular parental pressure on the student, the large guy isn't being particularly friendly or threatening, the guy stopping a robbery isn't especially cowardly, or dutiful, or disregarding of human life, etc.
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby ucim » Wed Dec 19, 2012 3:27 pm UTC

jules.LT wrote:Once again, don't just ask the questions: answer them!
Then I would just be talking to hear myself talk. At this point I am not trying to make a point, but rather, to elucidate our casual use of the phrase "of my own free will". For this, I think it's best I listen rather than talk, at least for the moment. Don't worry, you'll hear my take on it soon enough. :)
jules.LT wrote:This is actually interesting, it made me realize that I don't consider decisions based on one's ethical values to be less free.
Whether or not we should is a question worth asking (not in a moral sense, but in a word-usage sense), and one that might otherwise not have happened. I am hoping for insights like this to come out of the present discussion.

Yes, the situations are incomplete, and we'll all see the incompleteness differently. A complete list of completely specified situations would exceed the size of the universe. However, I think it is sufficient to stimulate discussion in what I think would be a fruitful direction.

Jose
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby jules.LT » Wed Dec 19, 2012 5:30 pm UTC

ucim wrote:At this point I am not trying to make a point, but rather, to elucidate our casual use of the phrase "of my own free will". For this, I think it's best I listen rather than talk, at least for the moment. Don't worry, you'll hear my take on it soon enough. :)

No, srsly: if this is to bring us anything, each of us needs to do it including you.
There's only three of us doing most of the talking, so that'll advance us 1/3 of the way!
Waiting around just means that we'll change the subject before you give your view...

For instance, you raised the issue of the definitions of problematic terms within our definition of free will pages ago.
We still haven't seen your definitions! (and I'd also like to know what you feel would be problematic/inaccurate in mine)

ucim wrote:
jules.LT wrote:This is actually interesting, it made me realize that I don't consider decisions based on one's ethical values to be less free.
Whether or not we should is a question worth asking (not in a moral sense, but in a word-usage sense), and one that might otherwise not have happened. I am hoping for insights like this to come out of the present discussion.

Those insights are useless if we don't talk about them! Don't just ask the damn questions, propose answers!
We'll give our own take about them anyway, don't worry.
____________________________________________________________________________

I think that moral values are usually among the traits most ingrained in our character, such that they're "fully" part of who we are and therefore not constraints on what "we" decide. That would make the degree of freedom of our will mainly dependent on how integral to who we are the bases for our choice are.
That dimension accounts for most of my gradings.

Conversely, I would consider someone whose choice is constrained by non-mental illness or what physically constrains us in general (e.g. a wall, chains, etc.) to still make free choices within those constraints. In fact, it seems to be only about what affects our state of mind and overrides our conscious will: alcohol, mental illness, strong emotions such as fear, parental pressure...

Parental pressure stands out because it seems more external, but I'd think that it's really psychological pressure mixed up with our values (sense of duty, how we value leisure against work...). That's why I would consider it less of a constraint on our free will than alcohol, but more than our most essential values alone.
It is on that scale _between mind-altering factors and what our "base" mind is__ that I now tend to think that we should measure free will.

See? That's how you do it.
Your go ;)
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby makc » Wed Dec 19, 2012 9:33 pm UTC

Az wrote:We're on page 14 now. Try to keep up?


Spoiler:
No :)

See, if I make a new thread on same subject, it will be probably locked with a link here. Still, I don't care what is on the page 14 here, I want to discuss what that guy said on the page 1. If noone wants to reply to that - well, okay, I'm not so lucky then.


That was a rhetorical question.

Keep up.

- Az

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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby makc » Wed Dec 19, 2012 9:39 pm UTC

ucim wrote:There probably is a value of P where we stop using the phrase "he gave me the money of his own free will" and start using the phrase "he forced it out of me". Each of us probably have different values of P for which this tends to happen. Some of us may have very different values of P for this.
Kind of makes the concept too flat, no? I mean, if the only difference between "free will" and "no free will" is numeric threshold :)

And since I'm right here ... don't double post please.

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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby ucim » Thu Dec 20, 2012 12:51 am UTC

jules.LT wrote:Once again, don't just ask the questions: answer them!
Ok, here are my numbers (for now):
  • A soldier, of his or her own free will, jumped on a live grenade when it was thrown into the foxhole.(5)
  • A student, of his or her own free will, chooses to take another math course instead of a lighter load, or an acting class.(9)
  • While walking down the street, a person,of his or her own free will, gives $20 to a large man who requests it.(7)
  • Same as above, except that the man's request is punctuated by a deadly weapon.(2)
  • At a restaurant, a person, of his or her own free will, orders "the usual".(9)
  • After being drugged, somebody's date agrees, of his or her own free will, to have sex.(1)
  • After being wined and dined, somebody's date agrees, of his or her own free will, to have sex.(7)
  • Somebody, of his or her own free will, shoots somebody else editwith no apparent cause.(9)
  • Same as above, but that "somebody else" was doing robbing a store.(8)
  • Same as above, but that "somebody else" was instead attacking his or her sister.(7)
  • Somebody having psychotic episode, of his or her own free will, shoots somebody else.(0)

These values are not to be considered absolute, or even all that well thought out (in fact, that would almost be self-defeating). As you said, it depends on circumstance.

Note the difference between being wined and dined, and being drugged. I am assuming that the drugging is covert, and the wining and dining is overt. The "free will" is being exercised throughout the entire wining and dining. Let's change it up a bit.

What if the (wining and dining) date were with the person's boss? And there was a large account in play at the time? What if it weren't the boss, but a co-worker? An influential co-worker? Does it matter if the person agreeing to sex could easily weather unemployment? (Granted, I am heaping a bunch of assumptions on all this, but the question is how much do these things affect the "freeness" of the given consent?

What if the drugging were more overt - at a pot party or a rave, for example (I assume a rave is overt - I've never been to one). What if it wasn't the partner who was offering (or administering) the drugs?

Does this follow the idea that will is less free if the suppression agent (wine, drugs, atmosphere) is overtly given over time vs. being insidiously snuck into the picture?

I differ with you about falling on the hand grenade... that is an instinctive reaction, not a thought-out one. It comes out of the pure mechanics of "who you are" (which is influenced over time by circumstance, and perhaps by deliberation). With careful deliberation at home, the soldier may prefer that somebody else jump on the bomb. But the pressures of war and buddy loyalty play into an instant decision. Similar kinds of pressures can lead to the kinds of torture our own GIs are reported to have inflicted on prisoners of war. The Stanford prison experiment (while badly done in some ways) illuminates this capacity we all seem to have, under the right circumstances, to act against our own nature. Are people under those circumstances acting "of their own free will"? To me the answer isn't an obvious yes at all, at least not the way I casually think of free will as applied to people.

(This may differ from how I analytically think of free will as applied to arbitrary entities, but right now I'm limiting myself to people, for a different perspective.)

Here are a few more:
  • A person, of his or her own free will, smokes their first cigarette. (9)
  • A person, of his or her own free will, smokes their second cigarette. (8)
  • A person, of his or her own free will, smokes their thousandth cigarette. (2)
My reasoning here is a combination of being wined and dined, and being drugged.

You keep talking about constraints on choice - I don't think that's the right word to use. (At least, it is not a word whose usage resonates in me with the idea I see it applied to.) I see, primarily and so far,
1: cases that include choices with profound negative consequences opposing choices with much less profound consequences, and
2: cases that include deterioration or evasion of the subject's cognitive facilities.


makc wrote:
ucim wrote:There probably is a value of P where we stop using the phrase "he gave me the money of his own free will" and start using the phrase "he forced it out of me". Each of us probably have different values of P for which this tends to happen. Some of us may have very different values of P for this.
Kind of makes the concept too flat, no? I mean, if the only difference between "free will" and "no free will" is numeric threshold
In this example, maybe it is. (I wouldn't treat it as binary, but there are two extremes and no reason to assume non-monotonicity given the one dimension in question.)

@makc, @Sanjuricus: To answer your question ("does a random number function embody free will?"), consider the answering machine example brought up several pages ago. Why would it (or would it not) satisfy you to call what it does an act of free will? Because the interesting question is not whether, but why.

Jose
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby guenther » Thu Dec 20, 2012 1:30 am UTC

ucim wrote:You keep talking about constraints on choice - I don't think that's the right word to use. (At least, it is not a word whose usage resonates in me with the idea I see it applied to.) I see, primarily and so far,
1: cases that include choices with profound negative consequences opposing choices with much less profound consequences, and
2: cases that include deterioration or evasion of the subject's cognitive facilities.

For what it's worth, I think free will applies in case 1, and free will gets eroded in case 2.

Also, I'm curious about your (or anyone else's) perspective on when case 1 gets subdivided into:
1a: The dichotomy of options is brought by someone else forcing their will on you, like the gun in your face scenario.
1b: The decision gets mandated by nature itself, like paying for medical treatment for some life-threatening condition (it could be a cheap and effective treatment to keep it similar to case 1).

Does this difference impact whether you would describe the person as choosing "of their own free will"?

As I've stated, for me it doesn't. I regard them the same.
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby ucim » Thu Dec 20, 2012 1:52 am UTC

guenther wrote:1a: The dichotomy of options is brought by someone else forcing their will on you, like the gun in your face scenario.
but guenther also wrote:For what it's worth, I think free will applies in case 1, and free will gets eroded in case 2.
"Forcing their will" is an expression which implies, to me, that "free will" no longer applies. If you really mean
guenther later wrote:As I've stated, for me it doesn't. I regard them the same.
then I would use a different phrase, such as "... somebody else giving me a particularly poor set of options from which, of my own free will, to choose".

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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby guenther » Thu Dec 20, 2012 2:24 am UTC

That's fine, we can describe it differently. But you didn't answer the question. I was curious if the division I created would make you change how you assigned numbers.
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby ucim » Thu Dec 20, 2012 3:06 am UTC

guenther wrote:That's fine, we can describe it differently. But you didn't answer the question. I was curious if the division I created would make you change how you assigned numbers.
I'm not convinced it does, though you raise an interesting point.

Thinking aloud... if a boulder is heading for me, I could "of my own free will" step aside (though there is not much time for thoughtful deliberation). Stepping aside, however, is a pretty nonspecific action. If the boulder were coming at me, a train to Boise was passing at the time, and I was at the edge of a cliff, I don't think it would be all that reasonable to say that "of my own free will, I got on a train to Boise". It's not like I could have gotten on a train to San Francisco instead.

In the case of paying for a life-threatening condition, I would presume that there is time to deliberate. OTOH, if I am having a seizure, I don't have that luxury. So in one case it's "who I am" that is primary, and in the other it is "how I contemplate" (which is part of who I am) that plays the major role in the decision.

Ok, so it's not a big burly guy demanding $20 at gunpoint, but a bear in the woods that is making threatening noises at me. Do I, "of my own free will", give the bear my steak? It's not the way I would use the phrase in casual parlance.

I would subdivide #1 differently:

1c: cases where a choice was inconsequential, but external circumstances are brought in that artificially make a particular choice especially unattractive (e.g. he pulls out a gun), and
1d: cases where the unattractivity of a particular choice is inherent - e.g. illness.
... which can be further subdivided into
1d1: cases where the illness is "natural" (got the plague), and
1d2: cases where the illness is artificial (i.e. somebody breaks your arm)

... so, I guess yes, the idea that somebody else's actions (somebody else's will) is being imposed on me does seem to figure into whether I consider actions to be "of my own free will". But deliberation vs instinctive responses also play into it.

Again, this is in my casual usage of the words, limited to people.

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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby jules.LT » Thu Dec 20, 2012 3:29 am UTC

ucim wrote:What if the (wining and dining) date [...]
What if the drugging [...]
Does this follow the idea that will is less free if the suppression agent (wine, drugs, atmosphere) is overtly given over time vs. being insidiously snuck into the picture?
[...]
Here are a few more:
  • A person, of his or her own free will, smokes their first cigarette. (9)
  • A person, of his or her own free will, smokes their second cigarette. (8)
  • A person, of his or her own free will, smokes their thousandth cigarette. (2)
My reasoning here is a combination of being wined and dined, and being drugged.

The assumptions you add to the initial scenarios are rather unexpected when you look at the initial proposals, and therefore constitute different scenarios. We don't need to add all kinds of scenarios to the list, only those that have constraints of a nature radically different from those of the other scenarios.
From now on, shall we indicate what we think is really novel about a scenario before we add it?

ucim wrote:I differ with you about falling on the hand grenade... that is an instinctive reaction, not a thought-out one. It comes out of the pure mechanics of "who you are" (which is influenced over time by circumstance, and perhaps by deliberation). With careful deliberation at home, the soldier may prefer that somebody else jump on the bomb. But the pressures of war and buddy loyalty play into an instant decision. Similar kinds of pressures can lead to the kinds of torture our own GIs are reported to have inflicted on prisoners of war. The Stanford prison experiment (while badly done in some ways) illuminates this capacity we all seem to have, under the right circumstances, to act against our own nature. Are people under those circumstances acting "of their own free will"? To me the answer isn't an obvious yes at all, at least not the way I casually think of free will as applied to people.

In the grenade case, that it might come out directly from who he is is exactly why I would think it is a case of free will.
But on second thought, and based on the principles I outlined in my previous post, I think that this case isn't that free.
Besides fear, there is the sense of duty and other values that are hammered into soldiers through peer pressure, constant repetition and various other means throughout their experience in the army. If he wouldn't make that decision after careful deliberation (which some would), then they probably aren't really part of who he is.

Conversely, I would think that the case of a man who jumps on the metro rails to make the kid who fell there flatten himself right between the rails and thus saved him (true story; he survived too) is mostly free will, because he wouldn't have done that if it hadn't felt profoundly right to him, i.e. it comes from the values that are part of who he is at his core.

How likely a person would be to make the same decision after careful deliberation is a tempting test of free will.
The problem I see with it is that giving in to "unreasonable" desires would always be considered unfree, which I don't think is true. It wrongly gives an exclusivity on free will to second order desires (what we want to want/the person we wish we were, for those who didn't follow that conversation), which we sometimes disregard in favour of more immediate desires "of our own free will", imho.

ucim wrote:This may differ from how I analytically think of free will as applied to arbitrary entities, but right now I'm limiting myself to people, for a different perspective.

The whole point of this discussion is to have a good definition of free will. I don't see how one that doesn't apply to all cases would qualify.

ucim wrote:You keep talking about constraints on choice - I don't think that's the right word to use. (At least, it is not a word whose usage resonates in me with the idea I see it applied to.) I see, primarily and so far,
1: cases that include choices with profound negative consequences opposing choices with much less profound consequences, and
2: cases that include deterioration or evasion of the subject's cognitive facilities.

Same as guenter, I don't see (1) as a case of unfree will. Given a situation, no matter how difficult, we make a choice. If we aren't affected by any case of (2), then it was "of our own free will".

In the cases of duress or material impossibility, justice will always see mitigating factors, but I'd say that the choice was still free. It's just that it was between options that didn't include a "right" one.

ucim wrote:@makc, @Sanjuricus: To answer your question ("does a random number function embody free will?"), consider the answering machine example brought up several pages ago. Why would it (or would it not) satisfy you to call what it does an act of free will? Because the interesting question is not whether, but why.

Indeed! :)

ucim wrote:I'm not convinced it doe

Guenter was writing from the point of view of someone who does think that case (1) includes cases of unfree will. I don't think he believes that the expression "force one's will on someone" accurately reflects what we mean by free will, and neither do I.
ucim wrote:I don't think it would be all that reasonable to say that "of my own free will, I got on a train to Boise"

Even though it's a situation "mandated by nature itself", there wasn't a choice to do so, so free will is irrelevant.

ucim wrote:I would subdivide #1 differently:

1c: cases where a choice was inconsequential, but external circumstances are brought in that artificially make a particular choice especially unattractive (e.g. he pulls out a gun), and
1d: cases where the unattractivity of a particular choice is inherent - e.g. illness.
... which can be further subdivided into
1d1: cases where the illness is "natural" (got the plague), and
1d2: cases where the illness is artificial (i.e. somebody breaks your arm)

... so, I guess yes, the idea that somebody else's actions (somebody else's will) is being imposed on me does seem to figure into whether I consider actions to be "of my own free will". But deliberation vs instinctive responses also play into it.

Tell me if I'm understanding you right: you're saying that man-made circumstances make the will less free but other circumstances don't? Then what if you're in a situation where you don't know whether the circumstances are man-made, does free-will become undecidable? I don't think so.

As for deliberation Vs instinct, the problem is that instinctive reactions are often indistinguishable from extremely quick decisions, even from the subject's point of view. Would you disagree that snap decisions that don't involve alteration of the subject's cognitive abilities are free will?

Edit: wow, wall of text... Sorry about that, I didn't realize I was writing so much :shock:
I'll add some more formatting to make the important points stand out.
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby ucim » Thu Dec 20, 2012 5:56 am UTC

jules.LT wrote:From now on, shall we indicate what we think is really novel about a scenario before we add it?
I don't think that is necessary, but it is not unwelcome either. My "what-if"s are simply intended to open discussion about reasoning, not to challenge any ratings. The initial scenarios are just to see how people (so far just you, me, and guenther) casually refer to free will. Somebody who is drugged by nicotine, for example, is not smoking "of their own free will", even if they became a smoker of their own free will. I suppose I was a bit harsh in giving the thousanth cigarette a (2). Probably (6) is more appropriate. But I (in casual parlance) see addiction as a free-will removal (or at least suppression) agent.
Spoiler:
Given that they became a smoker of their own free will, I still hold them responsible. But that's a different question.
Another way of putting it is that it takes a much stronger will to make a decision that goes against the one "suggested" by the addiction.

And I expect surprises. That's the point.

I see what you are saying about the grenade vs the metro rails, but I would hesitate to bring moral values into the discussion. I don't think morality has anything to do with free will. One can freely decide to be evil too. (...and we may not always agree on what is Good and what is Evil)

jules.LT wrote:The whole point of this discussion is to have a good definition of free will. I don't see how one that doesn't apply to all cases would qualify.
... but a good definition ought to either include, or cause one to re-evaluate, one's pre-existing casual use of the term. To that end, it is important to know what that is.

jules.LT wrote:In the cases of duress or material impossibility, justice will always see mitigating factors...
That is the case where the concept is invoked for the purpose of placing blame. But I'm not looking to place blame, just for our pre-existing disposition to the phrase in certain kinds of situations.

jules.LT wrote:Even though it's a situation "mandated by nature itself", there wasn't a choice to do so, so free will is irrelevant.
Sure there was a choice. I could decline to jump on the train, and be bowled over by the boulder. Or I could step aside and fall down the cliff. (Yes, a very artificial situation, but still illustritive) It just wasn't much of a choice. One could reasonably say "I didn't have any choice but to..." which implies that my decision was not one of free will. But the phrase "I didn't have any choice but to..." really means "I didn't have any options I liked but to..." and then we're back at a matter of degree.

jules.LT wrote:Tell me if I'm understanding you right: you're saying that man-made circumstances make the will less free but other circumstances don't?
I am saying that, in casual parlance, I would tend to use the words that way. Yes, this is an inconsistency. Casual parlance has many built-in assumptions that seem to work in ordinary circumstances, but break down when pressed. This is one of them.

jules.LT wrote:Would you disagree that snap decisions that don't involve alteration of the subject's cognitive abilities are free will?
I don't know. This is one of those circumstances that, in casual parlance, doesn't come up much framed as a free will question. It goes back to deciding whether how a decision is being made should figure into the equation, and that lands us back asking whether or not a toad or an AI has free will and applying that insight, whatever it is. Right now I'm approaching the question from the opposite side.

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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby guenther » Thu Dec 20, 2012 8:33 am UTC

ucim wrote:Again, this is in my casual usage of the words, limited to people.

Thanks for the response. And for me, my casual use of the words can also differ from the specifics that I'm promoting. Though it seems that my only occasion to talk about free will lately has been in this context, so now I find myself hesitating on ways that I would have said things in the past. I guess I'm just used to thinking about free will as a set of cognitive capabilities.
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby jules.LT » Thu Dec 20, 2012 1:03 pm UTC

ucim wrote:But I (in casual parlance) see addiction as a free-will removal (or at least suppression) agent.

I agree. And that the subject once decided to start smoking is an interesting twist. Even though the framework I used these last few posts only takes the subject's current situation into account, I think it still works out:
We attribute guilt to him, which we typically associate with free will. But that guilt is mostly related to the accumulation of choices to smoke that he's gone through, which used to not be so affected by addiction. The status of the current smoke depends on the current state of his addiction (and any other factors involved).

ucim wrote:I see what you are saying about the grenade vs the metro rails, but I would hesitate to bring moral values into the discussion. I don't think morality has anything to do with free will. One can freely decide to be evil too. (...and we may not always agree on what is Good and what is Evil)

I didn't mention morality, only values. One might profoundly value his own material well-being above all else; that doesn't sound quite moral to us, but it's still one of the core values based on which he makes decisions.

ucim wrote:
jules.LT wrote:The whole point of this discussion is to have a good definition of free will. I don't see how one that doesn't apply to all cases would qualify.
... but a good definition ought to either include, or cause one to re-evaluate, one's pre-existing casual use of the term. To that end, it is important to know what that is.

Casual use of the term has been examined a lot over the last 14 pages, and potential "good" definitions have been spelled out which do include and/or re-evaluate the various casual uses of the term.
I'm personally of the opinion that one is better than the others, and the point of further examination of casual use of the term, for me, is to challenge and refine that definition.
If you feel that your examination of casual usage brings up a new one, feel free to enunciate it and we'll work on that too...

ucim wrote:the concept is invoked for the purpose of placing blame. But I'm not looking to place blame, just for our pre-existing disposition to the phrase in certain kinds of situations.

The concept is used to place blame. That is part of the casual usage of it, and I'm analyzing it to see where there is free will and where there isn't: how our pre-existing disposition to the phrase fits with the definition I'm working on.

ucim wrote:
jules.LT wrote:Even though it's a situation "mandated by nature itself", there wasn't a choice to do so, so free will is irrelevant.
Sure there was a choice. I could decline to jump on the train, and be bowled over by the boulder. Or I could step aside and fall down the cliff.

I misunderstood, then. I was thinking that the person unintentionally got on the train while sidestepping the boulder.
In the case as you describe it, I agree that it's a clear of free will.

ucim wrote:
jules.LT wrote:Tell me if I'm understanding you right: you're saying that man-made circumstances make the will less free but other circumstances don't?
I am saying that, in casual parlance, I would tend to use the words that way. Yes, this is an inconsistency. Casual parlance has many built-in assumptions that seem to work in ordinary circumstances, but break down when pressed. This is one of them.
jules.LT wrote:Would you disagree that snap decisions that don't involve alteration of the subject's cognitive abilities are free will?
I don't know. This is one of those circumstances that, in casual parlance, doesn't come up much framed as a free will question. It goes back to deciding whether how a decision is being made should figure into the equation, and that lands us back asking whether or not a toad or an AI has free will and applying that insight, whatever it is. Right now I'm approaching the question from the opposite side.

If casual parlance is undecided or inconsistent, then it cannot inform us as to the essential characteristics of the concept. This is where we apply the rigorous philosophical definition, in order to solve those conundrums.
Bertrand Russell wrote:Not to be absolutely certain is, I think, one of the essential things in rationality.
Richard Feynman & many others wrote:Keep an open mind – but not so open that your brain falls out

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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby ucim » Fri Dec 21, 2012 3:51 pm UTC

jules.LT wrote:If casual parlance is undecided or inconsistent, then it cannot inform us as to the essential characteristics of the concept. This is where we apply the rigorous philosophical definition, in order to solve those conundrums.
This is philosophy, not science. The best we can hope for is self-consistency and insight. A rigorous philosophical definition cannot be tested against the real world, only against other ideas by which we categorize the real world. But to do that, we need to be clear on what those other ideas are. For reasons I stated earlier, I'm not even sure that a rigorous definition is even possible. But the discussion (the path towards one) can provide insight.

In thinking more about my own casual usage of the term "free will"...
ucim wrote:1: cases that include choices with profound negative consequences opposing choices with much less profound consequences
I would not say that, "while walking down the street, a person, of his or her own free will, gives $20 to a large man who requests it" when that request is punctuated by a deadly weapon. However, I would say that "that person freely chose between a high probability of death and a certainty of slight impoverishment". The mechanism of choice is unimpaired, the person has free will, and used it under rather disadvantaged circumstances, which were (almost) entirely external to the person making the choice. But note the difference between the two statements. One explicitly acknowledges the direness of the alternative, the other does not.

ucim wrote:2: cases that include deterioration or evasion of the subject's cognitive facilities.
I would not say that "after being drugged, somebody's date agrees, of his or her own free will, to have sex" but yet that is exactly what happened. In this case there were no threats and no dire alternatives. The date simply wanted to have sex and acquieced willingly.

The desire to do so was achieved by altering part of the person making the choice. The drug tinkered with the mechanism, which changes who the person is. Nonetheless, there is still a mechanism in place, and that mechanism is still freely making the choice.

So, the person who was actually there made the choice, of his or her own free will, to have sex. But the person who was actually there was not the person who would have been there without the drug (or who was actually there prior to ingesting the drug).

jules.LT wrote:In the case as you describe it, I agree that it's a clear of free will.
I think you accidentally a noun. :)

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Last edited by ucim on Fri Dec 21, 2012 4:26 pm UTC, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Definition of Free Will

Postby makc » Fri Dec 21, 2012 4:09 pm UTC

ucim wrote:@makc, @Sanjuricus: To answer your question ("does a random number function embody free will?"), consider the answering machine example brought up several pages ago. Why would it (or would it not) satisfy you to call what it does an act of free will? Because the interesting question is not whether, but why.
I actually brought it up because people often tend to stuck with - imho - irrelevant issue if random generator is predetermined or not, as if it matters here and not high level behavior the system demonstrates.

ucim wrote:
jules.LT wrote:@makc: we still have a will, but it's definitely not free; clear constraints are in place.
What is the difference between a constraint and an unpleasant option?
The difference is obvious: if you can or can not do something about it. The gravity is the constraint: no matter what you do, you are attracted towards large masses. The gun is not - you can do plenty of things - even if that causes your death in 100% outcomes except when you surrender $20. (edit: after random reading up there I see this is the opposite of how the word "constraint" was used originally, so nvm)

edit: then there is this option.


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